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MONETARY POLICY RULES AND
FINANCIAL STABIUTY
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates empirically the possibility that a central bank could adhere to a
macro-oriented monetary policy rule while also providing lender-of-last-resort services to the
financial system. The method considered involves smoothing week-to-week movements of an
interest rate instrument so as to achieve quarterly-avenge intermediate targets for the monetary
base, with these specified so as to keep aggregate nominal spending growing steadily at a
noninflationary rate. Simulations utilizing weekly U.S. data are conducted with a system
consisting of a policy rule for the federal funds rate—one designed to hit monetary base targets
obtained from a quarterly macroeconomic rule--and an empirically-based model of the response
of base growth to funds rate movements. Results for the periods 1974-1979 (Sept.) and 1988-
1991 suggest that such a procedure could succeed in reconciling macroeconomic goals with the
provision of lender-of-last-resort services.
Bennett T. McCallum




The subjectmatter of this sessionisthe relationshipbetween the two
ultimate goals recognized by most central banks, namely, macroeconomic
stability and financial—system stability.1 This is an extremely broad topic
and one that could be approached by various distinct methods of
analysis——evolutionary/historical, welfare theoretic, institutional, etc.
But given my own experience relative to others on the program, it seems most
appropriate for me to narrow the scope of the assignment by focusing
primarilyon one limited but extremely important setof issues.
These issues, which are closely interrelated, concern macro—oriented
rules for monetary policy and the central bank's role as a lender of last
resort. Are macro—oriented rules——such as those advocated by KcCallum (1988,
1993), Meltzer (1987), or Taylor (1988, 1993)——inappropriate because of their
neglect of financial market conditions? If so, might these rules be modified
so as to overcome that neglect?What are the implications concerning
lender—of—last—resortresponsibilities? Doesacceptanceofthese
responsibilities require the operation of a discount window? Or could they
be satisfied, as suggested by Goodfriend and King (19881, by means of open
market operations that involve smoothing of interest rates?
As here formulated, the answers to these questions depend to a large
extent upon the accuracy with which it is possible for the central bank to
hit intermediate quarterly targetsfor the monetary base by means of an
interest rate instrument while practicing smoothing——i.e.. while avoiding
large week—to—week changes in the interest rate. Consequently, a substantial
portion of the paper isdevoted to anattempt to measure this accuracy
empirically. As the econometric methods utilized are rather rudimentary, our
results must be regarded as exploratory, rather than definitive, in nature.
But estimation of a fully structural model is inhibited by data limitations
1and identification problems, so our first—pass analysis may be difficult to
improve upon substantially, in any event, it will provide a starting point
for further consideration of the issue.
Organizationally, the analysis begins in Section II with an overview
discussion of the broad topic of this session, a discussion which serves to
Justify our attention on the narrower set of issues described above. Section
III is then devoted to a backgrotmd review of some results relating to
monetary policy rules, formulated at the quarterly frequency, in which the
monetary base is treated as a policy instrument.Section IV develops a
framework for the study of a system in which quarterly-average base values
are viewed as targets to be achieved by manipulation at the weekly frequency
of an interest rate instrument. Basic simulation resultspertaining to this
system are given in Section V while Section VI takesup some alternative
formulations. Finally. Section VII contains a briefrecapitulation.
jJ Monetary Policy Rules for the Lender of Last Resort?
Before focusing our attention as described above it will be useful to
justify that strategy by reference to the broader topicassigned for this
session: the relationship between the goals of macroeconomic andfinancial
stability.The tension between these goals has recently been expressedby
Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1992), writing about thedesign of the European
Central Barth, in terms of the aphorism1 "A bankor a monetary policy rule?"
More generally, many economists have expressed doubtsas to the compatibility
of a strict monetary policy rule——or inany case one featuring a monetary
base instrument-—with central bank acceptance of lender—of—last—resort(LLR)
responsibilities,2 The achievement ofa base path as dictated by the rule
would conflict, according to this position, with the need tosupply liquidity
at times of crisis in accordance with the central bank'srole as a LLR.
2Recent discussions of alternative viewpoints pertainingtothe LU
role——see e.g., Bordo (1990), Humphrey (1992), and Summers (1991)——have
identified tour main positions. These are (I) the classical Thornton—Bagehot
doctrine, (ii) a "modern—pragmatic" position that calls (or more lenient
management of the discount window, (iii) the so—called "free banklng
contention that no public LLR is needed, and (iv) a "monetarist" scheme,
developed primarily by Goodtriend and King (1988), that calls (or LLR actions
via open—market operations rather than the discount window.3
As most readers will know, the classical doctrine developed by Thornton
(1802) and Bagehot (1873) calls for the US to lend aggressively at times of
crisis,4 to any solvent institution providing good collateral, but at a
penalty rate (a concept discussed below). This policy should, moreover, be
publicly known to prevail. A major objective is to support illiquid but
solvent institutions, thereby providing protection for the banking system
rather than for individual banks.5 Actual practice of the Federal Reserve in
recent years has deviated from the Thornton—Bagehot prescription in a number
of ways (Garcia and Plauti, 1988).Thus the Fed lends only to depository
institutions, rather than to any sound institution, and at rates that
represent subsidies to the borrowers.It has not spelled out its policies
publicly and has apparently been willing occasionally to lend to insolvent
banks.Summers (1991)expresses support for this sore lenient mode of
behavior,expressing the opinion that USpolicy"is probably anareawhere
James robin's insight that lit takes a heap of Flarberger triangles to fill an
Okun gap' is relevant,...Thisat least is the modern pragmatic view that
hasworked so far"(p.153). To the present author, itissurprising thata
prominent writer would take such a sanguine view of U.S. policy in this
area.6Perhaps Summers' argument rests on a presumption- thatthemassive
late-1980s expenditures by the FDICrepresentedonly transfers, not lost
3output.I would suggest, by contrast, thattheconstruction of a useless and
unoccupied shopping center does not constitute output. In anyevent,the
desirability of the modern pragmatic view has implicitly been thetopic of an
enormous volume of analysis.7it should be more useful for thispaper's
attention to be addressed to other viewpoints,
Proposalsof the"free banking" type have, despite the effortsof White
(1984),Selgin (1987), Glasner (1989). and Dowd (1989),received little
supportamong monetary economists in general.Different writers on the
subject have expressed different criticisms of theproposals. Laidler (1992,
p.192), for example, has suggested that "thevery nature of banking
precludes its being simultaneously wu-egulateci andcompetitive [because of
economies of scale in reserve holding),andthat arguments against the
regulationof banking based on theassumption of competition are therefore
inconsistent"Summers (1991, p.147) follows Goodhart (1987).in emphasizing
that "the true asset value of thebank's (non—marketed) loans is always
subject to uncertainty though their nominalvalue is fixed" [the latter
occurring because of the informationaladvantage of borrowers over even the
lending banic) and that "under theseconditions, it will benefit both bank and
depositor to denominate deposit liabilitiesalso in fixed nominal terms"
(Goodhart. 1937,pp. 36—87),But"the combination ...ofthe nominal
convertibility guarantee, together with theuncertainty about the true value
of bank assets, leads to thepossibility of runs on individual banks and
systemic crIses" (1987, p. 87)thereby requiring the assistance of a US.
Humphrey,finally, argues that"occasional shocks such as the threat of war
orthefailure of a large firmmay trigger moneyholders' desire to switch
from inside to outside
money" (1992, p. 573) which can only be supplied under
a fiat—money system by a centralbank or US. These criticisms have been
disputed by the proponents offree banking but, as stated above, most
4analysts remain unconvinced.
My own view is thatthereis an especially glaring weaknessinthe case
forfree banking thathas notbeenemphasizedbyits critics. Thatweakness
involves the basic argument of free—banking proponents that competition will
induceprofit—seeking bank firms to issue liabilities (bank notes and
deposits) that maintain their purchasing power over time because they are
redeemable in commodities or bundles that are designed to have reasonably
constant value, relative to a comprehensive consumption bundle. But itseems
highlyuncertain that individual bankingfirms would in fact choose to offer
that type ofliability under today's conditions. The free bankingliterature
islargely written in a manner that appears to suggest that historical
evidencesupports the questionable proposition under discussion, but that
suggestion is (I believe) unwarranted. For the principal historical examples
occurred during the era of commodity money standards, during whichbanks were
legallyrequired to keep their bank notes redeemable in the standard
commodity (e.g.. gold or silver coin).8 But the situation is, of course,
crucially different in today's era of fiat money.
The fourth position mentioned above, that of Goodfriend and King (1988).
would retain central banks and their role as a LLR, but would have LL.R
activities conducted by means of open market actions. In particular.
discount window lending would be eliminated and with it the need for most--if
not all——of the central bank's regulatory and supervisory activities. The
mainpoint of the Goodfriend—King argument is that the jobof the LLRisto
preventsystemic breakdown, not to protect individual banks.But systemic
crises involve sharply increased demands for high—powered money. which can be
satisfied by open—market purchases without discount window loans.Indeed.
such purchases will be triggered automatically inregime with interest rate
smoothing, since sharply increased demands for high-powered money would
5result in sharply higher interest rates if no central bait response were
forthcoming.
Anumberof objections to the Gocdfriend—Kinganalysis have been put
forth.Pleltzer (1988). for example,hassuggestedthat it would be
preferable to retain thediscountwindow butforlendingtotake placeonly
at apenaltyrate."Evenasmall penalty.., would ensurethatthe lender of
lastresort would do no lendingexceptina severe bankingcrisis when (or
if) marketsdo not function' (1988, p.445).Furthermore,Meltzer believes
that regulationandsupervision would notberequiredfor such loans.And
his"reason for insisting on retainingthelender—of—last—resort functionis
to avoid catastrophes like that of 1931—1933 when the (Fed) refused tolend.
Having penalty-rate loans (available) as an option means that banks have
access to base money even if the central bankrepeatsits major error of the
1930s"(1988, p. 446).
Inevaluating this suggestion, itis important to consider what is meant
bya "penalty rate."It must presumably not be a rate in excess of the
current market rate because the latter is the rate at whichborrowers can
obtain funds.What )leltzer has in mind, I believe, is a rate that is
somewhat above recent market rates.An example for the United States might
bethe previous week's average for the Federal Fundsrate plus 2 percentage
points (annualized),
Under this interpretation it becomes clearthat the Meltzer and
Goodfriend-King position are, though different, highlycompatible. For
interest rate smoothing, as prescribedby the latter, would presumably never
permit the Funds rate to rise to a levelas much as 2 percentage points (for
example) above the previous week'saverage.At some lower value—-its exact
position depending on the precisesmoothing rule adopted——the Fed would begin
to supply base money invirtually unlimited quantities. So the penalty rate
6would never materialize.Alternatively. )deltzer's proposal would keep the
discount window open, with a penaltyrate, andeliminate the practice of
interestratesmoothing.But market rate changes from week to week would
thenbe limited by the penaltymargin.
Cagan's(1988,p. 256) main objection to the Goodfriend—King proposal is
thatinterestrate peggingleadsto dynamic instability.'0 His argument does
not adequately distinguishbetween interestrate peggingandthe use of an
interestrateinstrument, however, thelatterbeing the relevant practice.
Andthe analysis in HcCalluni (1981. 1986) suggests that there is in fact no
instability or indeterminacy problem in this case if expectations are formed
rationally, provided that the central bank's policy rule for setting the
interestrateinstrumentreflectssomeconcern for sousenominal
magnitude——i. e., possesses a nainal anchor. •ii
Summers (1991) objects to the Coodfriend—King position rather strongly,
presenting three arguments. One of these involves a."reasonably clear lesson
from the (October 29871 crash period.It would not have been sufficient for
the Fed to keep the money stock growing steadily.... Their successful action
involved rapid money growth" (1991, p. 149).But this point is irrelevant,
since the Goodfriend—King prescription does not call for the Fed to keep
money growth steady.A more relevant claim of Summers' goes as follows:
"The crucial point here is that driving down the federal funds rate is not
likely to be sufficient to stop prophesies that predict the failure of banks
or securities firms from proving to be self—fulfilling. A more ambitious set
of lender—of—last resort policies would seem to be necessary" (1991, p. 150).
But Summers's "demonstration" in this case is based neither on experience nor
theoretical reasoning, but on a totally imaginary "scenario" that he created
out of thin air and used in several places in this paper.There is very
little reason, consequently, to give any weight to this second claim.
7The only substantial argument put forth by Summers, then, is that
"becauseof the relationship—specific capital each has accumulated, reserves
at one bank are an imperfectsubstitutefor reserves at another. Maintaining
a given aggregate level of lending is notsufficientto avoid the losses
associatedwith a financial disturbance" (1991. p. 149).But this argument
again seems to miss its target.The object of LLR policy is not to "avoid
losses" but to prevent systemic failure. And "maintaining anaggregate level
of lending" is an inaccurate characterization ofthe policy under discussion.
Myconclusion from this review is that convincing refutations of the
Goodfriend-King positionhave not yet been presented.Accordingly, that
positionwarrants further consideration, since itoffers a possible way for a
centralbank to provide US insurance against financialsystem breakdown
while generating little moral hazard andavoiding the need for an extensive
regulatory and supervisory role. 12
There is, however, an importantgap in the argument of Goodfriend and
King that remains to be filled.in particular, their analysis relies upon
the existence of interest ratesmoothing but does not provide any evidence
that such smoothing can be practiced withoutundermining longer—rim attention
to nominal macroeconomic goals suchas the avoidance of inflation. The
analysis in McCallta (198i) provides theoreticalsupport for the notion that
anappropriate behavioral rule might be feasible.Butthereremains a need
for a constructive example, withsome empirical foundation, of a policy rule
formanipulation of an interest rate instrument that combinessmoothing
behavior——and itsautomatic LLRservices——with a longer term trajectory that
achieves the objective of macroeconomicstability.An attempt to provide
sucha nile will be presents in Section
IV,but first some matters
concerningmacro—orients rules require discussion.
8III. Policy Rules for Macroeconomic Stability
In previous studiesI have exploredthe.properties in terms of
macroeconomic stabilization——the avoidance of inflation and sharpcyclical
fluctuations——of a specific, concrete, and operational rule for the conduct
of monetary policy.(See McCallum 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1993. )Theobjective
of the ruleis to generate a timepath for nominal aggregate spending that
growssmoothly at a non—inflationary rate, with nominalCNP being the
spending measure usedinexistingstudies. Theindication of these studies,
implementedfor theeconomiesofthe United Statesand Japan, is that the
rule wouldperform quite well from a macroeconomic perspective. It would,
that is, result in a nominal CUP growth paths that are less inflationary and
smoother than those that have prevailed historically.
An objection that has been raised by some critics of the rule is that it
relies upon the monetary base as an instrument variable. Actual central
banks strongly prefer, of course, to focus their day—to—day operations on
short—term interest rates, such as the Federal Funds rate in the United
States or the overnight call rate in Japan. This preference arises from a
belief that day—to—day and week—to—week interest rate volatility would be
greatly increased if attempts were made to keep the monetary base (or any
other reserve aggregate) in strict conformity with the values specified by
the policy rule in question.
But since the rule pertains to quarterly—average values of the base,
there exists the conceptual possibility of achieving these values to a fairly
high degree of accuracy while using an interest rate variable as the control
instrument on a daily or weekly basis.And obviously this possibility is
closely related to the Goodfriend—King method for providing USservices,
which we discussed in the previous section.It is conceivable, in other
words, that an interest rate rule could be devised that would provide
9smoothing behaviorand yet also achieve monetary base targets——now
intermediate targets—-dictated by a macroeconomic policy rule such as the one
investigatedin my previous studies.If the design of such a rule could be
achieved, it would then serve the double purpose of Ci) completing the case
for the Goodfriend—Icing scheme for the US function and also (ii) modifying
the case for the macroeconomic policyrulegiven In McCallua (1993) so as to
relyupon operating procedures more like those employed by the Fed, the Bank
of Japan. and other actual central banks.
InSections IV-VI,accordingly,arule for weekly adjustments of the
FederalFunds rate will be proposed and investigated using U.S. data.That
rule will be designed to hit weekly targets for the monetary base that will
yield quarter—average values for the base that are dictated by the quarterly
macroeconomic rule used in McCallua (1993).The remainder of this section
will be devoted to an explanation of that rule, some results concerning its
performance in simulations of the U.S. economy, and the generation of
intermediate target values for the monetary base that will be used to
generate weekly targets for the exercise in Sections tV—VT. 13
The rule used in my previous U.S. studies may be writtenas in equation
(1),where Xtandb1 denote quarter—average values of the log of nominal ClIP
and the log of the monetary base:
CI) Lb —0.00739—(1/16) (x1_1 — b..1 — x_i, + b_,7) + A(x_i —
HereA is a positive policy parameter and Xtisthe target value of xt.In
my earlier studies for the United States the x values were taken to increase
each quarter by 0.00739, i.e., to reflect constant growth of nominal GW' at a
rate of 3 percent per year.This value was chosen to give a time path of
realized x values that would grow at approximately the rate of long—term
annual growth of L!ii ClIP, since that would yield, an average inflation rate
of approximately zero.The purpose of the three terms on the rule's
10right—hand sideare as follows.First, the 0.00739 constant term is a 3
percentgrowth rate expressed in quarterly logarithmic units.Next, the
second term subtracts a magnitude equaltothe average growth rate of base
velocity over the previous four years.The purpose of thattermis to
provide a correction for long—lasting changes in velocity stemming from
regulatory and technological change. A four year average is usedtoavoid
incorporation ofcyclical movements in velocity. Cyclical influences,
finally,are accounted for by thethirdterm, which calls for a stimulative
increase in the base growth rate £b whentheprevious quarter's value of
nominalGNP was below its target value.
To determine whether the macroeconomic policy rule (1) could in fact
keep nominal GNP close to a steady target growth path, given the existence of
random shocks of various types, the researcher needs to conduct simulations
that include such shocks in a system consisting of the rule and an
econometric model that depicts the response of xt to the rule—generated
values of The fundamental difficulty is that there is no agreed—upon
model-—inpart because the macroeconomics profession hasnot developed a
satisfactorymodel of the short rundynamic behavior of aggregate supply that
governsthe response of real variables to monetary policy actions,iSBecause
ofthat problem, my preferred method of investigation has been to determine
whether policy rule Ci) will perform reasonably well in a variety of
different models. Thus my 1988 study of the U.S. economy included
simulations with two single—equation atheoretic specifications, several
vector autoregression (VAR) systems, and three models that wereintended to
bestructural (i.e., policy invariant). These latter models are quite small
in scale but are designed to represent three leading theories of business
cycledynamics—-the "real business cycle" (RBC) theory of Kydlandand
Prescott.the "monetary misperceptions" theoryofLucas andBarro, and a more
IiKeynesian theory(PC) patterned on the Phillips curve and price—adjustment
specificationsoftheFed'squarterly lIPS model.
Principal results for the U.S. economy, in counterfactual simulations
pertaining to the period1954.1—1985.4,aresummarizedin Table 1.The
entries in this table are root—mean—square errors (BHSE)——i.e., deviations
(rcathe target path——in simulations with systems including rule (1) and the
five models indicated.
16In each case the simulation begins with initial
conditions prevailing at the start of 1954 and continues with shocks fed into
the system each quarter, these shocks being estimated as residuals from the
equations estimated in the various models. It will be seen that for A values
in the range of 0.1 to above 0.25, the RMSE values are about 0.02(thatis, 2
percent) with all five models.17 Thus performance is satisfactory in all of
these cases, and distinctly superior to that with A —0.Higher values of A
give rise to the possibility of dynamic instrument instability, which occurs
with A —0.5in the VAR system (and with A —1.0in the other four systems).
Rut with moderate values of A, the rule succeeds in generating paths of Xt
that are noninflationary and, in addition, somewhat smoother than those that
have obtained historically. A plot of Xt and the constant rising target path
of x for the PC model and A a0.25is shown in Figure i.18
Recently I have come to believe that a strong case canbemade for
expressing the GNP target in terms of growth rates, rather than levels
corresponding to a single predetermined growth path.The main reason is
that,sincereal shocks that affect the economy's natural—rate output level
are highly persistent, it may be undesirable to quickly drive Xt back to the
predetermined x path after shocks have arrived.Instead, it would seem
preferable to treat past shocks as bygones, which could be accomplished by
adoptingX:X..1 +0.00739, rather thana +0.00739, as the target
valuefor period t.This sort of rebased growth—rate target has been favored
12Table I
Basic Results for U.S. Economy, 1954-1985
RMSEValueswith Five Models
Valueof AinRule (1)
Model 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50
Single Equation 0.0488 0.0249 0.0197 0.0162
4—VariableVAR 0.0479 0.0216 0.0220 0.1656
Real business cycle 0.0281 0.0200 0.0160 0.0132
Monetary misperceptions0.0238 0.0194 0.0161 0.0137
Phillipscurve 0.0311 0.0236 0.0191 0.0174
Table 2
Additional Results for U.S. Economy. 1954—1985
Results with Target Value and A0.25
Standard
RIcE RICE RMSE Standarddeviation
relativerelativerelative deviation ofhbtusing
S. • .
Model to x to )Ct toXtofAb Xttarget
Single Equation .0102 .0104 .0244 .0041 .0063
4-Variable VAR .0104 .0105 .0218 .0039 .0069
Real business cycle .0105 .0109 .0197 .0043 .0054
Monetary misperception .0110 .0116 .0184 .0039 .0051
Phillips curve .0104 .0103 .0234 .0048 .0066
13by several economists, including Feldstein and Stock(1993).19And the
suggestion of using rebased growth rate targets merits serious consideration
for two additional reasons. These are that instrument variability should be
reducedfor any given value of A and thatitshould accordingly be possible
to use larger A values,implying stronger feedback, without inducing
instrument instability.
Consequently, in my study of theJapaneseeconomy (HcCallum, 1993), I
conducted several simulations using a modifiedversionof rule (1) that
substitutes x for x.These simulations produced encouraging results.
They suggest, however, that an even •ore attractive rule would be one that
uses a weighted average of x and x, as the target variable. Such a target
..
wouldseem to provide most of the benefits of Xt without eliminating
entirely the tendency to drive Xt back to a fixedpath.A large portion of
theJapanese study was, therefore,conducted with a target of this type.The
.
weightschosen were 0.2 and 0.8 for xt and Xt so the target variable
•a utilizedwas Xt =0.2Xt + 0.8 Xt .Theresulting simulations indicated
that RICE values relative to the xr path suffered very little deterioration
whileperformance relative to the xpath wassubstantially enhanced,
relative to the case with xt targets.
Let us then consider performance with our five models of the U.S.
economywhen is used as the target variable.Summary results for the
simulation period 1954—1985 and A =0.25are reported in Table 2.There it
will be seen that RICE values relative to the target are only about 0.01
and that RICE values relative to the path are not too far from those in
Table 1. Furthermore, the variability of the Ab instrument is reduced
considerably relative to its magnitude in the simulations of Table 1, in
.
whichxt is the target.
14In addition, for three of the models RICE values have been obtained for
anupdated estimation andsimulationperiodthat extendsthrough 1991.4.
This updating is of interestand importance becauseof recent shifts in base
demandand because the evidence of Hess, Small, and Brayton(1993) suggests
thatthe performance of rule Cl) with the x target has deteriorated in
recent years.The models utilized are the basic single—equation version
(because of its simplicity), the VAR system (which because of lags is perhaps
the most difficult to stabili2e), and the Phillips curve model (which is
empirically the most satisfactory of the structural specifications). Summary
results with A values of 0.25 and 0.50 are reported in Table 3, with a plot
of the Phillips curve case (A s0.5)shown in Figure 2.As can readily be
seen, performance relative to the steady x, path deterioratesnoticeably,
relativeto Table 2, with A —0.25.The higher value of A yields smaller
RICE values, however, as conjectured above.Most importantly, we see that
performance relative to the utili2ed target, x? is almost as good as with
the shorter sample period. And since the argument above suggests that the
x.targetsare the most appropriate of those considered, the Table 3results
arequite encouraging.
We are now finally in a position to proceed with the main business of
this section from the perspective of the present paper. That business is to
generate quarterly time paths for the monetary base that conform to the
macroeconomic policy rule (1), in order to determine whether a funds rate
instrument can be used at the weekly frequency to achieve these base values
at the quarterly frequency. For that purpose, let us adopt the time path of
Abimpliedby the 1954.1 —1993.4 simulationwith A —0.50 inthe Phillips
curve model. This model has been chosen as the one that is perhaps the most
similar to models used by policy makers while the higher A value has been
chosen since itisthe more demanding from the perspective of our upcoming
15Table 3
UpdatedResults for U.S. Economy. 1954—1991
XtTargetValues
A—O.25 AO.SO
RPGERelative to R)GE Relative to
Model Xt ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
Singleequation .0125 .0099 .0413 .0109 .0099 .0305
4—variableVAR .0111 .0100 .0306 .0107 .0104 .0239
Phillips Curve .0110 .0099 .0343 .0103 .0100 .0260
16FIgure 2
Si.mulationwithTarget x













Rule(1), Target ?.andA —0.5
obs
1954 3.699626 3.699201 3.701861 3.700723
1955 3.695663 3.685769 3.678821 3.670292
1956 3.663447 3.660838 3.653607 3.646640
1957 3.635705 3.622726 3.617845 3.607567
1958 3.610314 3.617946 3.615145 3.602111
1959 3.587843 3.577400 3.565968 3.567536
1960 3.566199 3.553598 3.555266 3.555225
1961 3.565991 3.571272 3.569220 3.566943
1962 3.562037 3.554727 3.551242 3.550338
1963 3.554655 3.556308 3.559981 3.559844
1964 3.562261 3.561246 3.564794 3.567481
1965 3.574026 3.566553 3.565190 3.563168
1966 3.557531 3.550862 3.552993 3.553147
1967 3.551403 3.552872 3.557957 3.557715
1968 3.559741 3.555497 3.550994 3.550638
1969 3.552911 3.550609 3.552800 3.552005
1970 3.558019 3.565338 3.571514 3.576477
1971 3.591054 3.586729 3.592183 3.599308
1972 3.609258 3.607779 3.609905 3.614645
1973 3.613902 3.609248 3.610332 3.613725
1974 3.609658 3.616153 3.617774 3.620023
1975 3.622591 3.633976 3.636605 3.629527
1976 3.624797 3.619938 3.622463 3.625583
1977 3.624269 3.621913 3.615692 3.610757
1978 3.615292 3.616438 3.599481 3.594176
1979 3.585975 3.581275 3.576563 3.570283
1980 3.571408 3.566808 3.577621 3.579534
1981 3.571942 3.559871 3.563561 3.562610
1982 3.570922 3.584987 3.595935 3.613094
1983 3.631518 3.649563 3.661737 3.677940
1984 3.690174 3.697853 3.710630 3.726509
1985 3.744710 3.761105 3.781000 3.800733
1986 3.821689 3.839503 3.864610 3.886189
1987 3.909599 3.927389 3.946029 3.963543
1988 3.978593 3.995090 4.010744 4.026279
1989 4.039557 4.051177 4.062631 4.073216
1990 4.084578 4.093219 4.103212 4.112802
1991 4.128195 4.144728 4.159743 4.172677
LBisthelogof the St. Louis Fed'sadjustedmonetarybase, measured in $
billions.
17examination. Values of b for this simulation, which are reported in Table
4, imply corresponding 6b growth rates that will be used in the next section
as the basis of intermediate targets specified at the weekly level, with the
federal funds rate treated as the instrument variable.
IV. Hitting Base Targets with An Interest Rate Instrument
The purpose of this section and the next two is to determine whether it
would be possible to exert sufficiently accurate base control, as suggested
above1with an operating procedure that usesan interest rate instrument and
involves rate smoothing as a means of providing Liii protection to the
financial system. Our approach will be to conduct simulations with a system
that pertains to weekly data for the United States. The system will consist
of a policy rule that sets weekly values of the federal funds rate, together
with a weekly model of monetary base determination that is intended to
reflect the effects of federal funds rate behavior on realized magnitudes of
the base. The model will be extremely simple, but should give some
indication of the accuracy with which quarterly base targets can be achieved
whileholding down funds—rates movements, i.e.,engaging in funds—rate
smoothing.
The form of policy rule involved will be as follows, with time periods
referring to weeks:
(2) R. — = — eEb_1—
Herea,denotesthe funds rate (in annual percentage points) and b denotes
the log of the monetary base, both averaged over the week. The value b: is
the target value of b for week r.The idea is that values of b would be
derived in practice from quarterly magnitudesspecified by a higher—level
policy rule such as those generated by equation (1) of Section III.For the
purposes of the present exercise, b values will be treated asexogenous and
one objective will be to determine how closely realizedb, values track those
18for b. The magnitude of B determines the tradeoff between feedback response
and smoothing; smallvaluesimply a high degree of R., smoothing with
relatively little response to b target misses.The possibility under
consideration is that, fora range of Bvalues, feedback responses will be
S
strongenough to keep bclose to b while weekly LB., values are nevertheless
small(say,always less than 2 percent and typically much less).
The second ingredient of our system, then, is a model at the weekly
frequency of the response of b to fluctuations in R.,.In principle, one
would like to utilize a carefully specified andestimated structural model
pertaining to banks' demandfor reserves and the public's demand for
currency.Data non—availability and time constraints have, however, made that
infeasible. What I have done instead is to estimate a weekly univariate ARMA
model fortb, which should serve to depict with fair accuracy the
autocorrelation structure and variability of movements in the base. A term
reflectingcurrent—week responses to changes in the funds rate R., isthen
addedto this relation, with the response coefficient being based partly on
values taken from Federal Reserve literature and partly on empirical
estimates. These estimates are generated from weekly movements in the funds
ratesandnon—borrowedreserves, by means of a procedure that will be
explained below.First let us consider the univariate dynamic behavior of
b, the log of the base.
WeeklyARMA models for £b have been estimated for five time periods,
including Jan. 1969-Dec. 1978, Jan. 1974—Sept. 1979, Oct. i979—Sept. 1982,
Jan. 1983—Dec. 1991, and Jan. 1989—Dec. i991. The estimates are presented in
Table5. In all five periods an AMa) specification was found to be
reasonably appropriate, but with point estimates thatarefairly different
forsamples before, during, and after the 1579—1982 experience with
"nonborrowed reserves targeting." In addition to the threeARterms, it was
19found that a moving—average term at lag 26 was significant in all five
cases.
20My interpretation is that this reflects some type of seasonal
aberration that is present in the data but not in the market relationships
that our AMA model is intended to represent. This component will.
accordingly, be suppressed in the simulations reported in Section V.The
same Is true f or a dummy variable pertaining to one observation at the start
of 1991, which will be discussed below.
Examination of the results in Table 5 suggests that the three later
periods differ markedly from the first two, with negative coefficient
estimates summing to absolute values greater than 1.0 in all post—1979
samples.Ourfirstexperiment, accordingly, will be based on one of the
earlier periods.For the sake of sample—period homogeneity, the second
sample—-withexactly 300 observations——will be utilized.
To complete our model, that equation is augmented with the term
-0.0O25M, designed to reflect the immediate impact on the base of the
open-market purchase or sale needed to bring about any programmed change in
the funds rate.The magnitude of the slope coefficient was chosen on the
basisof three different sources of information.The first of these is the
rule-of-thumb relationship between borrowing levels andthe funds
rate—discount rate spread that, according to Cook (1989, p. 9) "the Fed has
long used." That rule of thumb is described as $400 million per percentage
point, but I would expect the ratio of borrowed to total reserves to be
related to the interest spread with greater stability. A $400 million change
in borrowed reserves would then amount to approximately a fraction of 0.02 of
total reserves with the latter being about $20 billion at the date (May 1981)
referred to by Cook. But a change in borrowed reserves brought about by an
openmarket action would have an effect on the, base of about the same
magnitude in terms of dollars, so the percentage change in the base would be
20Table 5
Weekly ARMS Models for ab
Jan1969— Jan1974— Oct1979—Jan1983— Jan1988—
Coeff. Dec 1978 Sept 1979Sept 1982Dec 1991'Dec 1991'
Const. . 0022 .0026 .0027 .0034 .0028
(.0002) (.0002) (.0004) (0003) (.0003)
AB(1) —.4270 —.4383 —.6082 —.7091 —.6225
(.044) (.055) (.075) (.044) (.061)
AMa) —.0925 —.0264 —.2593 -.4633 —.3819
(.047) (.060) (.087) (.050) (.068)
AB(3) —.1208 —.1920 —.3893 —.1977 —.2384
(.043) (.055) (.075) (.043) (.057)
P15(26) .1480 .3237 .1737 .4977
(.045) (.056) (.046) (.064)
B2 0.193 0.328 0.439 0.449 0.574
SE 0.0029 0.0024 0.0042 0.0043 0.0037
DV 1.99 1.92 1.97 2.03 2.12
Q(36) 39.6 47.6 97.7 38.1 43.9
'Uwnay variables also included for first week of 1991.
21much smaller (and of the opposite sign).Taking8as the ratio of base to
reserves,the 0.02 fraction in terms of reserves translates into about 0.0025
21 in terms of the base.
Oursecondsource of information is a slope coefficient in a "daily
reaction function for the open market desk as estimated by Feinman (1993).
The third column of Feinman's Table 1 suggests that a one percentage point
excessof the fundsrate,over its expected value, would induce the
open—market desk to supply $1461 million in additional reserves.Presuming
thatthedesk's action is designed to restore the fundsrateto its expected
level,this estimate appears at first to beconsiderably larger than that of
theprevious paragraph. But Feinman's quantity variable refers to the
magnitude of effect on the average value of reserves over a two—week reserve
maintenance period. So his value of $1461 million implies that this would be
the magnitude of an action taken on the first day of the reserve maintenance
period, with the implied figure being only half as large for an action taken
inthe middle of the two-week period. Takingthisto bea "typical" day, we
get amagnitude of $730million perpercentagepoint to be comparable to the
$400million of the previous paragraph.But Feinman's value pertains to a
sample period of Jan. 1988 —Dec.1990, during whichtime the average level
ofreserves was about $39 billion rather than $20 billion. So the fractional
effect would be 0.730/39 0.0187 $billion/percentage point, which agrees
very closely with the 0.02 figure (pertaining to reserves) of the previous
paragraph,
The third source of information is basedon direct estimation of an
equation similar to the one being considered, but in terms of non—borrowed
reservesrather than the base.The reason thatwe have not attempted to
estimatethisrelat ton with base data, by simply, adding a 8R term to the
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320 360 400 4.4.0 ;8O 520 560 600changes in currency or reserve demand rather than actions taken by the open
market desk.But anincrease in reserve demand would tendto producean
increase in the funds rate, so the estimated slope coefficient would tend to
bepositive rather than negative. With demand changes providing most of the
movement, the response of concern is notidentifiedin the data.There is
more reason to believe, however, thattherelevant response will be
identified if nonborrowed reserves are usedinsteadof the base. And,
indeed,least—squares estimation over the period Jan. i974-Sept.1979 yields
thefollowing values (with n denoting the log of nonborrowed reserves):
(3) An. = 0.0012 — 0. 5471hn..., - 0. 23i2An..2 — . 2783An..3 — 0. 0190AR.
(.0012) (.0557) (.0605) (.0547) (.0054)
0.292SE = 0.0212 DV1.97Q(36) — 92.2
Thus the estimated slope coefficient is almost exactly equal to the
rule—of—thumb value cited by Cook (1989). in terms of reserve movements. So
division by 8 willgivealmost the same slope coefficientas mentioned above
for thebase.The three sources of information agree quite closely in
suggesting a response coefficient of about —0.0025.
Insum,the secondequation in our simulation system is
(4) Ab,const. —0.4383ab1..1 —0.0264hb2
—0. 1920ab..3 — 0.00256R., + e4.
Heree6 is the residual from the estimated equation in the second column of
Table5, so oursimulation will feature shocks each period that reflect
estimates of the shocks that actually occurred over the sample period of Jan.
1974-Sept.1979.24
The other ingredient needed for simulation of the system (2) (4) is a
set of values for the weekly targets b.These are derived from the
quarterly targets b, generated by policy rule (1), reported in Table 4.The
quarterly values of b imply quarter—to-quarter growth rates Ab.These
valueshave been divided by13 to yield weekly growth rates b thatare
23constant within each quarter but change at each quarter's end.25 Those tab
rates then imply weekly values of b. The target path so generated for Jan.
1974-Sept. 1979 is plotted in Figure 3.
Finally, an adjustment needs to be applied to the AR}4A equation's
constantterm.26 The reason isas follows.As aglance at Figure 3 will
reveal,the base target valuesare decreasing, rather than growing, on
average over the years 1974 — 1979.But theconstant term in the estimated
tab, model in Table S is positive, since the base was actually growing over
the sample period.In a complete model the average growth rate of the base
wouldbe determined endogenously, but our simplified weekly system does not
include any component that would accomplish such an endogenization. That is,
the system includes no mechanism that would generate a positive relationship
between R, and tab, values at low frequencies——i.e., on average over long
spans of time. Only the short—term negative relationship is included. But
the average value of tab, generated In the simulation needs to match that of
the tab, targets; otherwise the weekly variations cannot possibly be matched.
Consequently, the constant term in the AB)4A model is altered to provide this
match.In particular, the 0.0025 value reported in Table 5 for the Jan.
1974-Sept. 1979 sample is replaced with the value —0.000208 in the simulation
runs.
V.BasicSimulation Results
Let us now consider the outcome of the experiment described in the
previous section.Some statistical results for four different values of 0,
thepolicy parameter in rule (2). are given in Table 6.Before examining
them, however, it may be useful to consult Figure 4, which plots the target
path b (denoted LBTAR) and the simulated path b., (denoted IS) in the case
with0cjQQ.Visual inspection will show that the rule is rather successful
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320 360400440480520 560600erratic nature of the target path is recognized.
In Table 6, summary statistics are reported for the following values of
B50, 100. 150. and200.In the first row we have root—mean—square (EMS)
values of the target miss, b - b,overthe300 weeksof the simulation
period.Sinceb, andbare naturallogarithms,the EMS value is a measure
of thetypical errorin fractional relative form.The second—column value
0.00370,forexample, can be thoughtofas slightly above one—third of one
percent. The second rowindicatesin the same fashion that thenximum
deviationofoutcome fromtargetwas Justover onepercentwitha—100, or
nearly1 i/2 percent with9 —50.
But howmuchinterest rate variability is entailed? The last tworows
give statistics pertaining to M,i.e.,simulated weekly changes in the
funds rate.Since)tIsmeasured in (annualized) percentage points, these
statisticsalso havethose units.Thus in coiumn two, we seethatwitha
100 the EMS change isabout37basispoints whilethe largestweek—to-week
changein the 300 week sample is 120 basis points.These figures do not
compare too badlywiththeactual historical record ofJan. 1974 — Sept.
1979ktheactualEMS value being 0.2i and the largest absolute change being
158 basis points (which occurred between June 26 andJuly3of1974).
The foregoing results are, I would contend, predominantly favorable to
the suggestion under study, namely, that it would be possible to exert
accurate base control with a procedure that involves smoothing——with its
associated LLR properties——of an interest rateinstrument. In the simulation
with0 — 100, for example, the implied degree of base control is highly
accurate and funds rate variability is not excessive.In particular, there
areno instances inwhich the required changein Rfrom the previous week
wouldexceed 2 percent, the magnitude mentioned in Section II as a plausible
limit reflecting Meltzer's penalty rate or the Goodfriend—King bound under a
25table 6
Simulation Results. System (2) (4)
Jan. 1974 —Sept.1979
Forb—b 0=50 0—100 6=150 0=200
• 00534 .00370 .00317 . 0030
MAY' .0145 .0120 .0108 .0100
ForAJt
RIE .265 .369 .474 .600
MAY' 0.73 1.20 1.62 1.99
'HAydenotesmaximum absolute value."
Table 7
Simulation Results, System (2) (5)
Jan. 1988 —Dec. 1991
Forb—b 8=50 0—100 0150 8*200
P115 .00739 .00529 .00461 .00447
MAV .0213 .0161 .0146 .0148
For AB
P115 .369 .529 .692 .893
MAY 1.06 1.61 2.20 2.96
2627
regime with LLR smoothing.
In this context it maybeof interest to determine how much R
variability would be entailed, in the model at hand, by exact base control.
An answer can be obtained by replacing equation (2) in our simulation system
with the condition b sband using (4)to determine a time path for R.
ThatexerciseindicatesthattheR?6 value for OR, the one—week change in
the funds rate,would be 0.998percent, almost threetimesas large as in
column2 ofTable 6.The maximumweekly change furthermorewould be 3.64
percent—-againabout three times as large as with rule (2) and B =100.
Nowlet us turn to our second selected time period for estimation and
simulationresults, namely, Jan. 1988 —Dec.1991.28 The simulation system is
similar conceptually to the one used above andindeedincludes poLicy rule
(2) as before. The target path for b is, however, quite different: it rises
continually (though at varying rates) in contrast to the up—and—down path of
Figure 3.The relation to be used in place of (4), based on the final column




Here the utilizedconstanttermis 0.0024,designedtomatchthesampletrend
asexplainedabove forequation (4),and the MA(26)termhasagainbeen
droppedfor the simulation. Inaddition,thedummy variable mentioned in
Table 5 has been suppressed. This dummy was included in the estimation stage
because the St. Louis Fed's base statistics show a $10 billion increase in
the week of Jan, 2, 1991. which is then reversed in the week of Jan.9,1991.
This spike would appear to reflect a year—end or some other typeof
aberrational effect that our modelisnot intended to reflect.








Simulation with System (2) (5)
Jan. 1988 —Dec.1991
LB LBTARI
1060 1080 1100 1120 1140 1160 1180 1200 1220 1240In (5) as in (4).That specification has been retained to be conservative
despite the suggestion of a steeper slope provided by a regression estlmate
comparable to (3) but for the sample period 1988_1991.29There are two
features of equation (5) that need to be mentioned. First, the values of the
AR coefficients sumto—1.257, a somewhat larger negative number than in (4).
Second, the variability of e5 is——as shown in Table 5——considerably greater
than fore4, makingaccuratebase control somewhatmore difficult.
Resultsof the simulations are presented in Figure 5 and Table 7.The
target path in the former is so different from that inFigure 4 that
comparison is difficult.The statistic values reported in Table 7 verify,
however, that base control is somewhat less accurate than in the 1974—1979
regime for a given level of AJtT variability. Thus, a value of 050 yields
about the same R}IS value for AR as with 0 —100in Table 6, but the RMS
control error for b is 0.0074 instead of 0.0037.Nevertheless, the results
arestill reasonably supportive of the Goodfriend—King proposal. With 0=50
or 0100, the maximum value of AR in the simulations stays below2.0 and
fairly tightbase control is achieved. The actual sample values of R}45 and
I4AVfor an., incidentally,are 0.18 and 1. 14.30
VI.Additional Results
In addition to the basic results reported in the previous section, a few
more have been obtained using variants of the equations of the simulation
system.The first variant alters the policy rule (2) so as to use the
average value of b: —bover the previous two weeks, rather than one week.
as the discrepancy to which the Fed responds. Because of the large negative
value attached to ab...1 in the AMA models (4) and (5). it seems possible
that such a change could reduce R variability without substantially
Impairing the extent of base control.Results relevant to that possibility
are presented in the top panel (System A) of Table 8, where it can be seen
28that there is not much difference for the 1974—1979 period, but that a
noticeable reduction in variability of R occurs in the later (1988—1991)
period,with 0 100.for example,theRi'S value for £R. is reduced from
0.529to 0.469 andthemaximumabsolutevalue from 1.61 to 1.41.
A second variant to the system involves a changeinthe slope
coefficient attached to aRin our model of base determination——equation(4)
or (5).It was mentioned above that our estimation of a relation like (3)
for 1988—1991 yielded a larger estimate of the slope than those inthethree
basic sources of information.Furthermore, the rule—of—thumb cited by Cook
(1989) pertains only to the slope of the borrowing function and thus does not
include any effect working through moneydemand——e.g. • anytendency for an
open—marketpurchase and reduction in B.,to increase the quantity of money
demanded. Thatneglectisperhaps appropriate for a one—week response
coefficient,but itmightbe arguedthatit tendstounderstatethe magnitude
of the response.In any event our experiment in the middle panel of Table 8
presumes that the slope is —0.005, twice the value used above.
With 9— 100,the rule's performance is somewhat better than previously.
especially for the 1988—1991 sample period. But with $ —150,performanceis
actually worsened. That outcome is somewhat surprising, since a larger slope
would seem to imply that hbwouldbe more controllable via manipulation of
B.,.But apparently the system becomes uncomfortably close to suffering from
instrumentinstability with the larger feedback coefficient e.
Thatproblem is mitigated, however, when the averaged discrepancy in the
policy rule of System A is combined with the stronger response coefficient of
System B.In the resulting System C, the performance measures (given in
panel three of Table 8) are almost uniformly better than those in Tables 6
29Table 8
Additional Simulation Results
Period 1974—1979 Period 1988—1991
8—100 0—150 0—100 0—150
System A
—b,R}€ .0037 .0032 .0053 .0045
MAV .0127 .0120 .0159 .0153
aR, RNS .343 .418 .469 .559
MAy 1.00 1.44 1.41 1.77
SystemB
—bP145 .0030 .0039 .0045 .0053
MAy .0100 .0107 .0147 .0180
alt, PIE .300 .581 .446 .795
MAy 1.00 1.62 1.48 2.70
System C
—b.,P145 .0029 .0027 .0041 .0039
MAy .0114 .0103 .0155 .0153
AR., P145 .245 .316 .323 .416
HAy 0.93 1.31 1.03 1.43
NoteSystems A and C usetheaverage- b., discrepancy for v—i and t—2 in
rule (2); systems B and C use0.005 asthe AR.,slopecoefficient in models
(4)and(5).
30and 7.Indeed, with B =100they are quite favorable. This finding suggests
that other specifications of the policy rule could be substantially superior
to our equation (2), but a systematic investigation of that possibility will
have to be reserved for future study. The object of the present paper is to
explore the feasibility of a Goodfriend—King type of rule, not to attempt an
optimization analysis.
The two sample periods utilized in our study were chosen for
reasons——concerning possible regime changes and conformity with previous
studies——that have considerable merit. Several commentators on the paper
have suggested, however, that the study's value would be greater if the stock
market crash of September 1987 were included in the second sample and
simulation period.Accordingly, additional results have been obtained with
that period extended so as to include July 1987 —Dec.i99i, rather than Jan.
1988—Dec.1991.
With that extension, the estimated weekly AB}4A model corresponding to
those in Table 5 differs only slightly from the results in the final column.
In particular, the SE value rises only to 0.0038 (from 0.0037) and the Q(36)
statistic actually falls somewhat, to 38.4. With the MA(26) coefficient and
the Jan. 2, 1991 dummy variable again suppressed, and the constant term
obtained as before, the implied base growth model is as follows:
(6) Ab =0.0035-O.6436Ab_1—O.4038th2
—0.2lS6àb3 —0.0025tR +
Resultsusing the basic policy rule (2) wIth evaluesof 100 and 150, and
also the three variants introduced in this section, are reported in Table 9.
There it will be seen that inclusion of the October 1987 stock market crash
in the sample and simulation periods does not significantly alter the outcome
of our exercise. In fact, the results are slightly better than those
reported for 1988—1991 in Tables 7 and 8.That finding, which is somewhat
31Table 9
Simulation Results. System (2U6)
July 1987 —December1991
Basic System System B
Forb—b 6=100 6—150 6=1006=150
8145 .00512 .00451 .0044 .0051
MAy .0153 .0148 .0149 .0183
For AR.
BuS 0.512 0.677 0.438 0.760
MAy 1.53 2.23 1.49 2.75
System A System C
Forb—b 6=1006150 6=1006=150
8)15 .0051 .0044 .0040 .0039
MAY .0153 .0155 .0156 .0154
For £R
8HZ 0.449 0.541 0.316 0.412
MAY 1.35 1.71 1.00 1.43surprising, stems from the fact that residuals from the estimated ARMA model
for 8b are not so large at the time of the crash as to outweigh their
relatively small size during the remainder of the second half of 1987.
VII. Conclusion
It may be useful to conclude with a summary of the foregoing analysis
andresults.The argument begins by noting that a centralbank's dual
objectives of macroeconomic and financial stability imply a tension that may
be expressed in terms of the following question: is the adherence to a
macro—oriented rule for monetary policy compatible with satisfaction of a
central barüCs lender—of—last—resort (Lilt) responsibilities? In Section II,
a brief review of alternative views on the Lilt role indicates that a proposal
by Goodfriend and King (1988) might provide a way of reconciling the two
objectives. For the proposal is to have LLR assistance supplied entirely by
open—market operations,with no discount window lendingbutwith
high—frequency smoothing of movements of a money market interest rate.The
point is that smoothing of day—to-day or week—to-week movements in this
interest rate would automatically trigger open—market purchases whenever a
sharp increase in the demand for high—powered money happenedto occur.But
such week-to-week smoothing could perhaps be compatible with use of this
interest rate as an instrument for hitting slightly lower—frequency (e.g..
quarterly average) intermediate targets conforming to a monetary policy rule
designed to yield desirable macroeconomic performance.
The bulk of the present paper constitutes an attempt to expiore this
possibilityquantitatively. Previousresultspertainingtoone
macro—oriented quarterly policy rule for the United States are reviewed and
used to generate weekly intermediate targets for the monetary base. Then (in
Sections IV-VI) an empirically based weekly model of monetary base
32determination Is developed and simulated together with a federal funds rate
rule thatentailsweekly smoothing.The base growth model consists of an
estimatedARNAequationwithan additionalterm reflecting the response of
thebase to weekly changes in the federal funds rate, with the response
coefficientbased onthree(compatible!)sourcesofinformation.
Counterfactualweekly simulations, in which the funds rate is adjusted so as
to hit base targets while practicing smoothing, ar. conducted for two sample
periods; Jan. 1974 —Sept.1979 and Jan. i988 —Dec.1991.Residuals from
theAMA model are fed into the simulation runs as estimates of shocks
hitting the system.
The results of these simulations are predominantly supportive of the
ideathatthe scheme under investigation would be successful. In
particular, they suggest that quarterly base targets could be achieved rather
accurately——withweekly root—mean—square(Rids)errorsof about 0.5
percent——whileholdingweekly interest rate changes to less than 2 percentage
points in all weeks and with a RidS average of about 0.5 percentage points.
This last figure naturally reflects somewhat more interest rate variability
than has been experienced in the United States, but the increase is not
dramatic——actual RI€values for our two sample periods were about 0.2
percentagepoints with a maximum of almost 1.6.
It would admittedly be desirable in principle to conduct this type of
exercise with a more elaborate and more nearly structural model of base
determination.But data limitations and identification problems make the
feasibility of such a study questionable. In any event, the results
developed here should be useful as an initial quantitative indication of the
workings of a macroeconomic policy rule for the lender of last resort.
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37Footnotes
1flere I have described the first goal as "macroeconomic stability" rather
than "price level stability" since most central banks are evidently concerned
with the mitigation of cyclical fluctuations in economic activity as well as
the avoidance of inflation.Issues involving the relative weight to be
attached to these two aspects of macroeconomic stability will not be
explicitly considered in this paper.
2See, for example, Summers (1991) and Soloi,s (1982).
3Friedaan (1960) argued much earlier for elimination of the discount window.
His proposal is significantly different from that of Goodfriend and King,
however, since it calls for a system with 100 percent reserves and does not
promote interest rate smoothing.Other recent arguments for closing the
discount window have been put forth by Kaufman (1991) and Schwartz (1992).
4Since Bagehot's proposal involves a penalty rate, it wouldappear that one
could replace "at times of crisis" with "at all times." This implication was
not mentioned by Bagehot, however, and has also been ignored by most writers
on the subject.
5For a more complete discussion ofBagehot's position, see Humphrey (1989.
1992).
Store typical, I believe, is the view takenby Nakajima and Taguchi (1993).
7Although their main purpose is to present their own analysis and proposal,
Merton and Bodie (1993) provide a large number of references. A synopsis of
bank failures is provided by Goodtiart and Shoenmaker (1993).
As I have notprovided evidence on this point, my statement is actually a
conjecture.To develop such evidence adequately, would itself consitute a
major study.
389Regarding this claim. Humphrey (1992, p. 572) asserts that "Bagehot
undoubtedlywould have concurred" I
10Cagan alsoputs forth the argument that the incremental social costs of
maintaining the discount window (and reserve requirements) are low, given
that elimination of deposit insurance and its associated regulatory apparatus
is politically out of the question.
Itmight bethoughtthata counterargument involving learning behavior,
ratherthan rational expectations, hasrecentlybeen put forth by Howitt
0992). It is my impression, however, thatthisargument pertains to pegging
rather than use of the interest rate as an instrument.
'2thatthecentral bank's roleinprovidingdaylight overdraft
creditto the payments system does not fundamentally conflict with the
Goodfriend—King proposal is implied by the analysisofNakajima and Taguchi
(1993, p. 32) who conclude that "if the role of the central bank ..;is
limited to settlement risk, ...[then)hardly any conflict of interest would
arise between its regulatory responsibility and its monetary objective."
t3Some readers may ask why we do not simplydesign an interest rate ruleat
the quarterly frequency to hit the macroeconomic targets, i.e.,nominal GM'
values.The answer isthatthe evidence in HcCallum (1990a) and (1993)
suggests that it is much more difficulttodesign an interest raterule at
thequarterly frequency with good macroeconomic properties. Indeed, attempts
to date have been rather unsuccessful.
14The next few pages draw on the discussion in McCallum (i993).
'5Foradditional discussion of this point, see McCallum (1988).
160n1y one of the VAR systems considered in McCallum (1988) is included.
39171t mightbe noted forcomparative purposes that the RMSE value for the
actual historical path is0.771, over 30times aslargeas the cases with the
ruleand amoderateA. A more relevant comparison is the RNSE for the actual
historical path relative to a fitted trend line; that value is0.0854.
18These results were developed in my 1988 paper. In McCallum (1990a) it was
foundthat substitution of anexplicit price level target, rather than
nominalClip, is somewhat less satisfactory since it leads toan increased
likelihood of instrumentinstability.Also, a fewexperiments with an
interest rate instrument were attempted. In KcCallua (1990b) the purpose was
to determine whether adherence to rule (1) would have prevented the Great
Depression of the 1930s.Counterfactual historical simulations for
1923—1941 were conducted with a small model of GNPdetermination,estimated
with quarterlydata for 1922—1941.The simulation results suggest that
nominal ClIP would have been kept reasonably close to a steady 3 percent
growth path over 1923-1941 if the rule had been in effect, in which case it
seems extremely unlikely that real output and employment would have
collapsed, as they did in fact.
19Such a target would result ina nominal GNP path that has a unit—root
component——indeed, that is close to a random walk with drift.But if the
drift magnitude were 0.00739, or whatever is the average rate of output
growth, then expected inflation over any horizon would be zero. Furthermore,
price level variability over practical planning horizons would not be
excessive if the variability of x —xwere small.
20This term is not included in the third column results of Table 5,
whichpertain to the Oct. 1979—Sept. 1982 period. Thereason is that
it entersmuch too strongly when included, suggesting a parameter redundancy
situation.
4021The argument of thisparagraph can be spelled out more explicitly as
follows. Let 8 =(1/Th)dBRidrsbe the parameter that is estimated as 0.02 on
the basis of the quoted rule of thumb, with BR, 111, NBR,andrs denoting
borrowed reserves, total reserves, nonborrowed reserves, and thefunds
rate—discount rate spread. But we presume that the relevant experiment isan
open—market purchase (sale) that increases (decreases) nonborrowed reserves
leaving borrowed reserves unaffected.The estimate of 8 is then interpreted
as (—1/Th)dNBRjdrs (—11TR)dTR/drs and therefore as —dlogTR/drs.But with
currency assumed not to respond within the week, we have dB/dTR —I(where B
denote the base) so dlogB/dlogTR =(TRiB)dBidTR=ThIS.Thuswe finally
obtaindlogB/drs = (dlogB/dlogTR)dlogwjdrs = -e(TRJB) = —0.02/8—0.0025.
Feinman(1993) reports a smaller estimated value for the sampleperiodFeb.
i984-Oct.1987.But policy behavior during the 1988—1990 period should
be more like that of 1974—1979, since both of these featuredtighter control
of the funds rate.During i984—i987 the operating procedure was one of the
"borrowed reserves targeting" type.
23Thissuggestion is related to a major theme of a recentpaper by ciristiano
and £ichenbaujrj (1992).
24A weakness ofour procedure that pertaims to this sample period is as
follows.Since our simulation exercise presumes that total reserves (not
currency) is thecomponent of the base thatresponds during the week to open
marketactions, we are implicitly assuming that the regime is not one with
laggedreserve requirements (which makes the demand forreserves almost
entirely predetermined), That is of course counterfactual for 1974—1979.
4125There is a slighttiminginconsistencyin my procedure,since
quarter—to—quartergrowth ratesbasedonquarterly averages have beenused
for each week within a quarter.But that is of virtually no consequence,
given the purpose of the present study——to see if the b path can be matched
by simulated b, values.
26This adjustment provides the reason why the constant term is designated
"const.,"with no numerical value listed, in equation (4).
270neunattractive feature of the resultsis that M values are predominantly
negativeover one long portion of the simulation period, and thus lead to
large negative values for the level of R.. But that is arguably an artifact
ofthe functional form used in (4): ifa log—log function had been used
instead,it would not have been possible to drive R negative. I have kept
the scsi—log form nevertheless to avoid departing even farther from the Fed's
rule of thumb" relationship between borrowing and the funds—discount rate
spread.
281nthiscase the initial date was chosen to coincide with that promoted by
Feinman(1993).A few readershave suggested thattheperiodof
"non-borrowed reserves targeting." Oct. 1979 —1982,would be appropriate for
the study.My belief is just the opposite; the combination of a reserves
instrument plus a regime with lagged reserve requirements is extremely poorly
suited to monetary control and so would suggest much greater volatility than
would be experienced under a more sensible regime.
29For this period,weekly-average statistics on nonborrowed reserves include
observations only for every other week.With denoting the• two—week
change in R, the estimated relation is £n —.0017—.4812M..2—. i66SM._4
—.O33AR,with= 0.314,SE •.017,and no evidence of autocorrelation in
the residuals.
4230Again we can find how much R variability would be required for exact base
control,according to our model. The RMS and MMfiguresare 1.50and5.50
forthe1988-1991 internal, considerably larger——as one would expect——than
for1974—1979.
43